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VALUATION OF PROPERTY, LABOR OR SERVICES TAKEN IN PAYMENT FOR STOCK
At law the relation of creditors to the corporation is the ordinary relation of debtor and creditor and in the absence of statute
there is -no relation between the creditors and stockholders. The
corporation is a legal entity, distinct and separate from the stockholders who compose it, and consequently when a person extends
credit to a corporation he looks to the corporation and not to the
stockholders for payment. In equity, however, we find a different
rule and in many cases judgment creditors are allowed to maintain bills against the stockholders of a private corporation.
The jurisdiction of equity to enforce the liability of stockholders to the extent of the par value of their stock, has given
rise to the so-called "trust fund" theory. Justice Story attempted
to explain the jurisdiction of equity in this regard in the case
of Wood vs. Dummer, 3 Mason 3o8, Fed. Case No. 17944.
This case established the doctrine that the capital stock of a
corporation is "a pledge or trust fund for the payment of the
debts created" by the corporation. This doctrine is founded on
the proposition, that as the state undertakes to relieve the stockholder in a corporation of general liability for the debts of the
concern, to the amount that he has invested in the enterprise, he
ought, in good faith, to pay in money or its equivalent,, the face
value of the stock so received. If he fails .to do this, he should
be treated as holding the remainder in trust for the benefit of
the creditors of the corporation. The "trust fund" theory has
been reaffirmed in the following cases:
Sawyer vs. Hoag, 17 Wall. 6io.
Upton vs. Tribilock, 91 U. S. 45.
Sanger vs. Upton, 96 U. S. 56.
Pullman vs. Upton, 96 U. S. 328.
Graham vs. Railroad Co., 1O2 U. S. 148, I6I.
Handley vs. Stuta, 139 U. S. 417.
It is unfortunate that this theory crept into the law. It has
caused considerable confusion and was not necessary for the decision in the case of Wood vs. Dummer, supra. The stockholders
could have been held liable on the ground of fraud. Technically
speaking, no trust either express or implied is created.
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"A trust implies two estates or interests, one legal and one
equitable, the trustee holding the legal title, while the cestui que
trust has the beneficial interest. The capital of a corporation is
its property and the corporation has the whole beneficial interest
in it as well as the legal title. The corporation may sell or dispose of its property the same as any natural person. It is a
trustee for its creditors in the same sense and of the same extent
as a natural person, but no further."
Hospes vs. Northwestern Mfg. and Car. Co., 48 Minn. 174.
If we follow this theory to its logical conclusion, any creditor
of a corporation could maintain a bill to recover the assets constituting portions of the capital stock which have been divided
among the stockholders or have been otherwise diverted. The
United States Supreme Court has, however, refused to carry this
doctrine to such an extent and in the case of Hollins vs. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, refused to entertain a bill
brought to recover dividends paid out of capital of the corporation. The "trust fund" doctrine was later criticized and limited
to cases where the corporation is insolvent, and in the case of
McDonald vs. Williams, 174 U. S. 397, the court said: "We
think the theory of a trust fund has no application to a case of
this kind, i. e., where a stockholder in good faith received a dividend, believing the same to be paid out of the profits, the bank
at the time such dividend was declared and paid being insolvent.
When a corporation is solvent, the theory that its capital is a trust
fund, upon which there is any lien for the payment of its debts,
has in fact very little foundation. No general creditor has any
lien upon the fund under such circumstances, and the right of
the corporation to deal with its property is absolute so long as
it does not violate its charter or the law applicable to such corporation."
Thus we see that the later authorities have been reluctant to
follow the "trust fund" theory and in many jurisdictions the doctrine has been repudiated entirely.
The remaining cases can be conveniently divided into two
groups: (i) those which have established the "good faith" rule,
and (2) those which have adopted the "true value" rule. These
rules are most commonly applied in cases where stockholders have
paid for their stock either in property, lahor or services. Some
states have constitutional or statutory provisions expressly requir196
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ing that the property, labor or services shall be taken at a fair
value. Therefore if a corporation fraudtilently issues its stock
for property, labor or services at an overvaluation, the transaction is illegal and void as to dissenting stockholders, or creditors
who relied upon the fact that the entire capital stock of the corporation was paid in full.
The courts which have adopted the "good faith" rule are not
in harmony as to what must be shown to constitute good faith.
Some courts hold that mere overvaluation of the property given
in exchange for stock will not of itself render the stockholder
liable for the difference. These courts require an affirmative
showing of fraud, and in the case of Smith vs. Prior et al, 58
Minn. 247; 59 N. W. loi6, they refused to allow evidence to
show that the corporation accepted in payment of the stock property which was greatly overvalued and grossly inadequate in
value to the par value of the shares of stock issued. The court
held that inasmuch as there was no allegation of fraud in the
complaint, this evidence was inadmissible under the pleadings.
Reynolds, J., speaking for the court in Schneke et al vs. Andrews, 57 N. Y. 147, says: "If promoters of a corporation * * *
with a view to defraud, fill up the capital stock by putting in
property at grossly exorbitant values, they are not to be exempted
from personal liability * * * But if in the furtherance of an
honest purpose they fall into error in judgment in placing a
pecuniary value upon property supposed to be needful for the
success of the enterprise, I think a different rule should prevail.
I think it need only be suggested in support of this position, that
upon the question of the value of property, and more especially
that adapted to mining, mechanical and manufacturing purposes,
a very wide difference of opinion may honestly exist among the
most intelligent of men familiar with such operations. There is
no exact mathematical value which can be applied to mines or
minerals in the bowels of the earth or to mechanical contrivances
or manufacturing establishments, when their development is
sought for by associated wealth. It is a matter of commonest
observation, that the most intelligent and conscientious of men,
upon such questions entertain widely different opinions; and it
would be a fatal blow aimed at every such enterprise, if those who
honestly risk their capital in such adventures shall be held as
guarantors to all creditors for its eventual success."
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In the case of Coit vs. North Carolina Gold Annalgamating
Co., I19 U. S. 343, it was held that a gross and obvious overvaluation of property would be strong, although not conclusive,
evidence of fraud. In other jurisdictions the courts require a
showing of intentional fraud or such reckless conduct in fixing
the value of the property conveyed, without regard to its value
that an intent to defraud may be inferred.
Graves vs. Brooks, 117 Mich. 424; 75. N. W. 932.
Kelley vs. Fletcher, 94 Tenn. I; 28 S. W. lO99.
Rickerson Roller Mills Co. vs. Farrel Foundry & Machine
Co., 43 U. S. App. 452; 23 C. C. A. 302; 75 Fed. 554.
New Haven Horse Nail Co. vs. Lenden Springs Co., 142
Mass. 349; 7 N. E. 773.
The other class of cases which have adopted the "good faith"
rule hold that overvaluation itself, especially if it is gross, constitutes, or at least raises, a very strong presumption of fraud.
This presumption is conclusive unless it is rebutted by strong and
convincing evidence which fully explains the apparent bad faith.
All that need be proved is (I) that the stock exceeded in amount
the value of the property in exchange for which it was issued
and, (2) that the stock was issued deliberately and with knowledge of the real value of the property; no further fraudulent
intent need be alleged or proved.
Douglas vs. Ireland, 73 N. Y. 104.
Boynton vs. Andrews, 63 N. Y. 96.
Elvton Land Co. vs. Birmingham Warehouse & Elevator
Co., 92 Ala. 407; 25 Am. St. Rep. 65.
Wallace vs. Carpenter Electric Heating & Mfg. Co., 70
Minn. 321; 68 Am. St. Rep. 530.
Coleman vs. Howe, 154 Ill. 458; 45 Am. St. Rep. 133.
National Tube Works Co. vs. Gilfillan, 124 N. Y. 302.
Van Cleve vs. Berkey, 143 Mo. O9.
Wetherbee vs. Baker, 35 N. J. Eq. 501.
Manhattan Trust Co. vs. Seattle Coal & Iron Co., 16
Wash. 449.
It is not sufficient for the stockholder to show that as a mental
operation, he did not intend to defraud anyone. He is required
to show further, that in the exercise of ordinary business sense
and prudence, he was justified in believing and did believe that
the property was being turned in at a fair valuation. Where the
facts are undisputed and the overvaluation so great as to show
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that the stockholder ought to have known if he had exercised
ordinary business prudence and foresight, his actual belief or
intention will be of no avail to him; the presumption is that he
intended the reasonable and natural consequences of his act, which
was to defraud creditors in the event of the insolvency of the
corporation. The underlying doctrine of these cases is that where
property is taken into a corporation in excess of its value, the
creditors of the corporation and the public in general are deprived
of the security contemplated by the statute and if a stockholder
sells his property to the corporation, receiving in exchange stock
the par value of which greatly exceeds the value of the property,
he knows or ought to know that his act amounts to a fraud upon
the public and the creditors of the corporation. The courts, however, make allowances for honest differences of opinion or mere
mistakes in judgment.
Hastings Malting Co. vs. Iron Range Brewing Co., 65
Minn. 28.
THE "TRUE VALUE" RULE.
The "true value" rule in substance provides that, where stock
is issued in exchange for property, it will be considered paid up
to the extent of the true or actual value of the property so taken
into the corporation. The stockholder is held personally liable
for any deficiency which may exist. In the jurisdictions which
have adopted the true value rule it is unnecessary to allege or
prove any fraudulent intent on the part of the stockholder. The
mere fact that the property has been overvalued is of itself sufficient to render the stockholder liable, regardless of his intention.
The overvaluation may have been made in the utmost good faith
and without any evil intention toward subsequent creditors, but
the fact nevertheless remains that these corporators held out to
the world that the corporation had a fully paid up capital, when
in fact this was not true. They may honestly believe that the
corporation will prosper and soon be running on a sound business
basis, but they are not allowed to cast a part of this risk upon the
others.
Gates vs. Tippecanoe Stone Co. et al, 57 Ohio St. 60; 48

N. E. 285.
In the case of Libby vs. Tobey, 82 Me. 397; 19 Atl. 9o4, the
court held that the payment of stock in anything but money will
not be regarded as a payment except to the extent of the true
value of the property or thing received in lieu of money.
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"An honest mistake in judgment will not necessarily destroy
the value agreed upon, but it must be such a valuation as prudent
and sensible business men would approve. Values based upon
visionary or speculative hopes, unwarranted by existing conditions or facts, and without reasonable evidence from present
appearances are not such as the law will tolerate, as against
creditors."
State Trust Co. vs. Turner, iii Ia. 664; 82 N. W. lO29.
In Wisconsin the liability of a subscriber for shares of stock is
governed by Sections 1753, 1757 and 1758, R. S., 1917, which

are practically a reiteration of the common law as enunciated by
the courts which have adopted the "true value" rule.
Section 1753 provides that no corporation shall issue any stock
except in consideration of money, property or labor estimated at
its true money value, actually received by it, equal to the par
value thereof, nor any bonds or other evidence of indebtedness
except for money, labor or property estimated at its true money
value actually received by it, equal to seventy-five per cent of the
par value thereof. All stocks and bonds issued contrary to the
provisions of this section shall be void.
If bonds are issued in defiance of the statute, the fact that
they are pledged, not sold, cannot avail to give them validity.
The term "issue" is here used in the sense of "deliver" or "put
forth." Such bonds are of no binding force for any purpose, and
equity will prevent their passing into the hands of persons who
might be bona fide purchasers for value.
National Foundry & P. Works vs. Oconto Water Co., 52
Fed. 29.

Inventions for which patents have been applied for and the
prospective patents are "property" within the meaning of this section. Whitchill vs. Jacobs, 75 Wis. 474, but the issuance of the
corporate bonds for antecedent debts is not issuance for "money,
labor or property" within the meaning of this section. Nichols
vs. Waukesha Canning Co., 195 Ied. 8o7 .
A person holding stock issued to him as collateral security for
a debt of the corporation is not liable to it for the same as if he
had subscribed for it; nor is he liable to the creditors of the corporation unless he allowed himself to be represented as a stockholder to them, and they (the creditors) acted in reliance thereon.
Andrews vs. National Foundry & Pipe Works, 77 Fed. 774.
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The statutes, however, do not prohibit the selling of shares of
stock upon credit. Whitewater Mfg. Co. vs. Baker, 142 Wis. 42o.
The purchaser of corporate stock for less than par value, and
the corporation making the sale are both parties to an illegal
transaction, and the former will not be aided in a court of equity
in an action against the corporation to obtain a rescission of the
transaction or a recovery of the consideration paid. Thronson
vs. Universal Mfg. Co., 164 Wis. 44.
This section, however, was not impaired or repealed by the
Negotiable Instruments Act, and the provision that corporate
bonds which are issued for price or value less than seventy-five
per cent of their face value, shall be void, will be enforced
between the corporation issuing and the party directly receiving
such bonds. In re Valecia Condensed Milk Co., 233 Fed. 173.
Section 1757 provides that the books of a corporation shall at
all reasonable times be' open to the inspection of stockholders;
and that every creditor of a corporation shall be informed at any
time of the amount of capital stock of such corporation subscribed, the amount paid in, the names of the stockholders, the
amount of shares owned by each and the amount unpaid by each
of the stockholders, upon the shares owned by him, and if any of
the shares of stock, which were not fully paid for, have been
transferred, the same and the amount due thereon at the date of
such transfer. This duty is imposed upon the officers of the corporation, and if they refuse to do so, they are liable for any
damage which may result because of such refusal.
The corporation and its officers may be compelled to permit
such inspection of the corporate books by a writ of mandamus.
State vs. Bergenthal, 72 Wis. 314.
Where the books and main offices of a foreign corporation are
m this state, a resident stockholder, acting in good faith, is entitled
to a writ of mandamus to compel said officers to permit him to
examine the corporate records and ascertain who the stockholders
are and what they paid for their stock. State ex rel Quinn vs.
Thompson's Malted Food Co. et al, i6o Wis. 671. This decision
shows that Section 1757 applies not only to domestic corporations, but also to foreign corporations doing business in this state.
Section 1758 provides that in actions by creditors against the
stockholders to recover what may be due and unpaid on any
stock, such stockholders shall only be credited with such sums
as have actually been paid in money or its equivalent in value
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and not with any dividend which may have been declared and
applied on such stock.
The case of Gogebic Investment Co. vs. The Iron Chief Mining Co., 78 Wis. 427, was an action by a judgment creditor of
the defendant corporation to compel certain stockholders to pay
up their stock to the extent of its full and fair value. The
defendants received stock in exchange for property, which was
in fact only worth about one-tenth of the par value of such stock.
The plaintiffs' judgment had been returned unsatisfied, the corporation being insolvent and unable to pay its debts. The question on a demurrer to the complaint was whether the complaint
was sufficient because of the failure to allege that the stock was
issued fraudulently. The court held that the allegation of fraud
was unnecessary and that the complaint stated a good cause of
action against the defendant stockholders. The presumption is
that a transaction of this kind is a fraud upon the creditors, and
the parties by whom the stock was issued will be held liable to
such creditors, to a further payment upon their stock to the par
value thereof, if it be necessary to make such further payment
to satisfy the corporate debts. The holder of such stock is considered a debtor of the corporation to the extent of the difference
between the par value of the stock and the true value of the
property given in exchange of such stock. This is a liability
imposed upon the stockholder by law, and the corporation can
in no way relieve him of this liability.
In conclusion it may be said that the creditor must work out
his cause of action through the corporation. It is a legal fiction
and the creditor possesses rights which the corporation did not
have. The creditor is not precluded from his suit by the statutes
of limitation, nor by other omissions of the corporation to proceed against the stockholder; all that need be shown is that his
execution against the corporation was returned unsatisfied and
the corporation has become insolvent. His cause of action is then
complete.
EDGAR BARK, '19.

